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PROTECTION OF WORKERS FROM ABUSES IN UNION
PROCEDURES
T HE protection of members of labor unions, or would-be mem-
bers, from discrimination and injustice at the hands of the
union is a problem of increasing importance. Labor organiza-
tions have become an integral part of our industrial life. They
have acquired more and more authority, statutory and otherwise, to
speak and act for their members. In many instances, employ-
ment is conditional upon membership in a union. Hence, the
right to be admitted as a member of a union, and to continue as
such, and the remedies available for union abuses are of vital
concern to employees.
RIGHT TO JOIN A UNION
At common law, labor unions like other voluntary associations
are held to have arbitrary powers to exclude from membership
whomever they please. In the absence of statute, a court has no
authority to compel a union to admit an applicant to member-
ship, regardless of the hardship or injustice caused by the expul-
sion.' This rule is an old one. For centuries courts have refused
to interfere in the internal affairs of voluntary associations, such
as clubs, lodges, fraternal orders, and churches, and this refusal
has extended to the affairs of unions.2 The judicial attitude has
been one of laissez faire, and in the matter of exclusion from
membership the courts have felt that they should not force the
companionship of one man upon another.
It seems evident that there are significant functional differences
between social clubs and labor unions and that application of
1 Mayer v. Journeyman Stonecutters Assoc., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Atd. 492 (1890) ;
See Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COL. L. REv. 33 (1947) ; Mintz, Trade
Union Abuses, 6 ST. JOHN L. REv. 272 (1932).




identical rules to the two types of organizations is inappropriate.
A rule which precludes judicial interference in the internal affairs
of all voluntary associations precludes judicial protection of em-
ployees in the enjoyment of important economic rights and priv-
ileges. The effects of such a rule applied to a union may well be
felt throughout a community, where no repercussions would result
from the application of the rule to a social or religious group.
Assuming that interference with a union's policy of exclusion
is desirable, control may be exerted directly upon the union or
indirectly by protecting an employee from the consequences of
exclusion. In 1943, a Texas statute3 (the Manford Act) was
passed attempting the direct approach. Section 10 of this statute
provided:
"It shall be unlawful for any labor union to refuse to give any person
desiring membership therein a reasonable time, after obtaining the
promise of employment, within which to decide whether or not he
desires to become a member of such labor organization, as a condition
to such person's employment by the employer .... "
Violation of the statute was made a misdemeanor and injunc-
tion was available for enforcement. However, this provision of
the statute was held unconstitutional in American Federation of
Labor v. Mann' on the ground that it was vague, indefinite, and
ambiguous.
The indirect approach is seen in Texas legislation of last year
making the closed shop (and variation thereof) illegal and un-
enforceable.! The statute declares that a person's right to work
and bargain with his employer individually or collectively shall
not be infringed and that no person shall be deprived of employ.
ment because of membership or non-membership in a union. Thus,
in a case of exclusion from a union, the statute would appear to
protect an employee from the loss of his job because of his non-
3 TExs STAT. (Vernon's Supp., 1943) Art. 5154a.
SId.,§ 10.
5 188 S. W. (2d) 276 (Te. Civ. App. 1945).
STExAs STAT. (Vernon's Supp., 1947) Art. 5207a.
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membership. A large number of states have passed similar legis-
lation outlawing the closed shop and discrimination against non-
union employees.'
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 leaves unions
free in their admission policies but offers protection to employees
excluded Section 8 (a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to discharge a non-union employee except pur-
suant to a union shop agreement properly entered into with a
union representing a majority of the employees. Even when a
proper union shop agreement prevails, the employer may not dis-
charge if he has reason to believe that the non-union employee
has been discriminatorily excluded. Further, in these circum-
stances, Section 8 (b) (2) makes a union guilty of unfair labor
practice if it exerts pressure upon an employer to discharge a
non-union employee who has been excluded for some reason other
than failure to pay uniform fees and dues.
Apart from statute, there appears to be no court decision en-
forcing a right to join a union. However, there are indications
that a right might be developed in certain critical situations.'
Where a union has a closed shop or has wide-spread control over
employment and refuses to admit new members, it takes on aspects
of a monopoly conducted for the private benefit of present mem-
bers. In James v. Marinship Corporation," the court compelled
a union in this situation either to give up the closed shop or to
make membership open to all without discrimination. Of course,
there is considerable authority, of twenty or thirty years ago, for
action for damages or injunctions where a union engages in labor
warfare to cause discharge of a non-union employee.11 Such hold-
7 See DeHay, A Comparative Study of State Labor Legislation Enacted in 1947,
included within this issue.
8 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Public L. No. 101, 8Oth Cong., 1st Sess.,
Ch. 120).
9 James V. Marinship Corporation, 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944) ; Wil-
liams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. (2d) 586, 165 P. (2d) 963
(1946).
10 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944).
31 See TU.zEa LABOR DisPUTEs AND CoLL crwi BARGAINING, §§ 90 and 97 (1940).
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ings protect the so-called "right to work" but do not compel a
union to remedy discriminatory admission policies. It seems doubt-
ful that courts will come, unaided by statute, to the conclusion
that unions are quasi-public in character and owe a duty to accept
members without discrimination."
RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS
Once a worker is admitted to union membership, important
rights, privileges and benefits accrue to him. These accrue to
him under the constitution and by-laws of the union, which con-
stitute a contract between the union and its individual members."3
Meetings are provided for and members have a right to attend
and to vote for oflicers and policies of the union. They are vested
with an interest in the funds and the property of the union.
Usually provision is made in the constitution and by-laws for
discipline and punishment of member for infraction of union
rules. Procedures are commonly set up under which a fair trial
is afforded on the question of guilt and appropriate penalty.
Not infrequently union members feel a need for judicial pro-
tection of their rights, privileges and benefits. Especially is this
true where expulsion from the union has been ordered and the
union has extensive control (through the closed shop or other-
wise) over employment. At early common law the courts assumed
a "hands-off" attitude. Unions were regarded as self-governing
organizations whose private affairs were not subject to judicial
review." The courts stressed the similarities between unions and
social clubs and fraternal orders and ignored vital economic dif-
ferences.
In modern times the public has become very interested in the
internal affairs of labor unions. Such matters as admission to
membership, expulsion, freedom of elections, and autocratic powers
12 But see, note 9 supra.
18 Cameron, et al. v. Durkin, et al, 74 N. E. (2d) 671 (1947) ; See Witmer, Civil Lib-
erties and the Trade Unions, 50 YALE L. J. 621 (1941).
14 Screwman's Benef. Assn. v. Benson, 76 Texas 552, 13 S. W. 379 (1890).
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in labor leadership have increasingly been considered of public
concern. "lThe reason is that the internal affairs of union have
a direct impact on the right to work and on the economic life of
a community. No doubt this public interest has at times been
stimulated by anti-labor groups. Nevertheless, it is safe to say
that some of the abuses have occurred in union treatment of its
own members and that a legislative or judicial remedy should be
available.
It is clear that a union may prescribe in its constitution and
by-laws the terms on which membership is conditioned. These
terms may include prohibitions of certain conduct, with penalties
attached for infractions. The prohibitions often include disorderly
conduct at meetings, working with non-union employees, working
in a manner inconsistent with accepted union practices, breach of
strike, giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and other actions
harmful to the union interest. The California Court has said that
a union may expel a member on one or two grounds: (1) com-
mission of an act which is specifically prohibited by the rules of
the organization and for which the penalty of expulsion is pro-
vided; or (2) conduct of any character which violates the funda-
mental objects of the organization and which, if persisted in and
allowed, would destroy the union or bring it into disrepute."6
If a union acts pursuant to its authority, as set forth in the con-
stitution and by-laws, and if a fair trial has been had, the decision
of expulsion or other penalty is final, and the courts will not inter-
fere." Of course, the rule violated must have relation to proper
union objects and may not be opposed to sound public policy. It
is said that a person who joins a union assents to the laws of the
15 Otto v. Journeyman Tailor's Protective and Benev. Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217
(1888). See Frieden, The Public Interest in Labor Dispute Settlements, 12 LAW AND
CONTEMP. Peon. 384 (1947).
16 Otto v. Journeyman Tailor's Protective and Benev. Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217
(1888) ; Becker v. Calnan. et al., 313 Mass. 625, 48 N. E. (2d) 668 (1943) ; Reily v.
Hogan, 264 App. Div. 885, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 423 (1942).
17 Webb v. Chicago, R. 1. and G. Ry., 136 S. W. (2d) 245 (Tex. Ci'. App. 1940)
Screwman's Benef. Assn. v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 13 S. W. 379 (1890) ; Dragwa v. Fed.
,era] Labor Union, 136 N. S. Eq. 172, 41 A. (2d) 32 (1945).
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organization and binds himself to abide by its decisions fairly
arrived at in regular proceedings. Further, where a member has
suffered expulsion or other penalty and has not exhausted his
appeal within the union, the courts consider this an additional
reason for refusal to interfere."8
In conducting its proceedings a union need not adhere to the
formalities of legal proceedings. 9 It is enough that the accused
member has been given, in substance, a fair trial. The require-
ments of a fair trial are notice of charges, reasonable time to
prepare for the trial, a hearing, and opportunity to present wit-
nesses and to rebut the case made by the opposition. ° It is to be
noted that a union has wide latitude in interpreting and applying
the language of its constitution and by-laws."
Where proceedings resulting in expulsion or other discipline
have not been conducted in compliance with union rules or in
compliance with "fundamental principles of justice," the great
weight of authority allows the aggrieved member to apply to the
courts at once for relief, regardless of whether appeal remedies
have been exhausted.22 Under either view for the court to inter-
fere. the defect in the proceedings must be serious, preventing a
fair trial. The aggrieved member has been successful in his suit
where notice of charges was not given and a generally unfair trial
was had; where the proceedings were characterized by fraud or
bad faith; where a conspiracy existed to oust plaintiff from mem-
bership; where prejudice manifested itself preventing the possi-
bility of a fair trial; and where provision for appeal within a
union is so unreasonable and expensive as to deny substantial
is Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N. J. Eq. 172, 41 A. (2d) 32 (1945).
19 Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N. E. 791 (1931).
'0 Local No. 7, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (1922)
Headley v. Operative Plasterers and Cement Finishers Intl. Assn. Local No. 31, 324 Pa.
257, 188 Atd. 206 (1926).
21 Thompson v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al.,
91 S. W. 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
-2Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931) ; Gersh v. Ross, 238 App. Div.
552, 265 N. Y. S. 4.59 (1933) ; Nissen v. International Brotherhood T. C. S. H., 229 Iowa
1028, 295 N. W. 858 (1941).
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justice." Courts occasionally review the proceedings to determine
whether the charges against a member are legally sufficient and
whether there was evidence to sustain a finding of violation of
union rules. 4
The judicial remedy in these cases has taken the forms of in-
junction, writ of mandamus, and the action for declaration of
rights. Injunction has probably been most commonly used, since
it is a flexible writ protecting both personal and property rights.
The judgment usually declares the expulsion or other penalty void
and restores the aggrieved member to his previous status.
Where an aggrieved member does not seek reinstatement in the
union but asks damages for wrongful expulsion, the courts ap-
parently make no requirement that union procedures and appeals
be exhausted.25 The theory has been that an expelled member is
no longer under union authority and should not be subjected to
its regulations and procedures.
In Texas, legislation has been passed bearing upon the suf-
ficiency of cause for expulsion from a union and the procedures
leading to this action. Section 10 of the Manford Act states:
"It shall also be unlawful for any labor union to expel any member
thereof except for good cause, and upon a fair and public hearing by
and within the organization, after due notice and an opportunity to be
heard on specific charges preferred. Any court of competent jurisdic-
tion upon his petition therefor, shall order reinstatement of any member
of the labor organization who shall be expelled without good cause." 2
It is apparent that the section is, in the main, declaratory of com-
mon law principles developed in recent years. Noteworthy is
23 Harris v. Grier, 112 N. J. 9Q. Atd. 50 (1932): Thompson v. Grand International
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. et al.. 91 S. W. 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) ; Abdon
v. Wallace. et al., 95 Ind. App. 604. 165 N. E. 68 (19291 : International Lonashoremen's
Assn., et al., v. Graham et al., 175 S. W. (2d) 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill. 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 4.56 (1926): Dallas Photo
Engravers Union. 148 S. W. (2411 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
24 MacPherson v. Green. 72 N. Y. S. (2d) 790 (1947).
25 Shinskey v. Tracey, 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957 (1917); International Printing
Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America v. Smith. 198 S. W. (2d) 729 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
20 TEx. STAT. (Vernon's Supp., 1943), Art. 5154a.
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the declaration that expulsion can only be ordered for "good cause,"
confirming that a court may review the sufficiency of the reason.
The union hearing is to be both "fair" and "public"; the latter
requirement is desirable and was not entirely clear at common
law. The section apparently allows judicial relief on a petition for
reinstatement, a simplification which avoids questions as to whether
mandamus, injunction or other special type of writ should be
employed. The question whether union procedures must be ex-
hausted before resort to the courts under this statute has not been
decided as yet.
While the Texas statute provides a direct remedy for wrongful
expulsion, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 safe-
guards the employment rights of a worker wrongfully expelled.
Section 8 (a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to discharge a non-union employee except pursuant to a
union shop agreement properly entered into with a majority union,
and even then, he may not discharge if he has reason to believe
that the employee has been expelled for some reason other than
payment of uniform union dues and fees. Section 8 (b) (2) rules
it an unfair labor practice for a union to exert pressure upon an
employer to discharge an employee under these circumstances.-7
CONCLUSION
It seems safe to assert that the tendency toward legislative and
judicial interference in intra-union affairs will continue. Union
action in refusing admission to applicants for membership, in
expelling members, and in imposing discipline and penalties has
serious effects upon the persons directly involved. The disputes
arising may bring serious economic loss to a community. The
interests of the individuals concerned and of the community have
impelled courts and legislatures to make available judicial rem-
eiies where unfair or arbitrary action has been taken.
lamres F. McCarthy.
:r See Note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
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